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ABSTRACT 
 Since the Communist Party of the Philippines began waging its insurgency in 
1968, it has presented a persistent security challenge for the Philippine government. 
Numerous studies have examined the New People’s Army (NPA), but little attention has 
been given to the National Democratic Front (NDF)’s efforts, particularly its 
International Solidarity Works (ISW), to surreptitiously establish an international 
organization to support the insurgency. Studies suggest that diaspora communities 
consistently emerge as a source of external support for homeland struggles. Because 
external assistance often improves insurgents’ capabilities, it makes counterinsurgency 
harder and costlier. Given the existence of the Filipino diaspora as a newer diasporic 
community, the Philippine communist movement could have already been receiving 
assistance from Filipino migrants, a possible contributing factor to the movement’s 
resilience. This thesis examines the role of the ISW as part of the NDF strategy and the 
benefits it gains by internationalizing the Philippine communist movement while at the 
same time disrupting the Philippine government’s existing international relations. By 
drawing on Gordon McCormick’s diamond model and Doug McAdam’s political process 
model, this thesis explores how the ISW weaponizes the Philippine diaspora and affects 
Philippine national security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
Since the insurgency movement waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP) began in 1968, a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist inspired revolution has been a persistent 
security challenge for the Philippine government. The movement is considered the longest 
ongoing communist insurgency in Asia. In recent years, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) have focused primarily on the armed struggle waged by the CPP and its 
military arm, the New People’s Army (NPA). Little attention has been given to the National 
Democratic Front (NDF)’s efforts to surreptitiously found international organizations and 
groups supportive of the insurgency.1 As an umbrella organization established in 1973, the 
NDF, according to Victor Corpus, has functioned “to win all possible allies to totally isolate 
the ruling regime and to give direct and indirect support to the armed struggle being wage 
[d] in the country side.”2 This support to the armed struggle includes “political, diplomatic 
and financial activities.”3 Its political activities, in particular, have aroused suspicions and 
attracted the AFP’s attention. Reducing the impact of the NDF’s deceptive activities has 
become a priority in military operations: these actions may have given the AFP the upper 
hand in its counterinsurgency campaign.4 However, the results are still inadequate to 
completely defeat the CPP, which just celebrated its 50th anniversary in December 2018.  
                                                 
1 The National Democratic Front (NDF) is engaged in expanding and collaborating with other 
valuable, relevant organizations in accomplishing the insurgency’s goals. “About the Revolutionary United 
Front Organization of the Filipino People,” National Democratic Front of the Philippines, accessed 
November 30, 2019, https://ndfp.org/about/. 
2 Victor N. Corpus, Silent War (Quezon City, Philippines: VNC Enterprise, 1989), 57. 
3 Soliman M. Santos Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos, “Part Two: Armed Group Profiles,” in Primed 
and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Quezon City, Philippines: 
South–South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement and Small Arms Survey, 2009), 263, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.432.9002&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=51. 
4 The NDF can initiate massive demonstrations or rallies called people strikes involving different 
sectors of society, including government workers, which can easily paralyze the government. This activity 
undermines the government but also affects the economic condition of the people who join the rally and 
earn a daily living. See Olle Törnquist, “Communists and Democracy in the Philippines,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 26, no. 27/28 (1991): 1683–1691. 
2 
The CPP-NPA-NDF modeled its armed struggle after the Soviet Union and the 
People’s Republic of China by establishing an international front organization called 
International Solidarity Works (ISW). Its objectives initially included establishing ties with 
foreign non-government organizations (NGOs) and, later, organizing Filipino migrant 
communities to be involved in the movement.5 Through ISW, the NDF coordinates the 
founding of international organizations and groups supportive of the CPP, such as Migrante 
International, an advocacy group for overseas Filipino workers (OFWs).6 Some of these 
international organizations are beyond the AFP’s reach and lie in the realm of diplomacy. 
Moreover, because of the AFP planners’ limited understanding and appreciation, ISW is 
often ignored in formulating strategies to end the insurgency. This is the very reason further 
study of it must be undertaken.  
This thesis examines the role of the NDF’s ISW in the ongoing insurgency waged 
by the CPP with a goal of overthrowing the Philippine government. By evaluating the 
utility of ISW to the insurgency movement, military, and civilian leadership can better 
evaluate its effect on counterinsurgency efforts and help formulate a more effective plan. 
This will be accomplished by examining various CPP and NDF/ISW activities, in 
particular, the international ones, and other related case studies on external supports’ roles 
and their effect on insurgency. Numerous studies have already been conducted about the 
NPA insurgency, but they focused primarily on the armed struggle rather than on the 
activities of the NDF/ISW. This limited understanding of ISW is the gap this research 
intends to fill. 
  
                                                 
5 Armed Forces of the Philippines, “CPP-NPA-NDF ISW” (presentation at the DOF-AFP Meeting, 
Manila, Philippines, November 2018). 
6 Founded in 1996, this organization claims to have 200 members in 23 countries. Migrante is a 
Filipino term for migrant. See “Home Page,” Migrante International, accessed April 2, 2019, 
https://migranteinternational.org/. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study seeks to answer the following questions:  
1. What is the role of ISW in the Philippine insurgency and its effect on 
counterinsurgency? 
2. Is the Filipino diaspora ISW’s target? 
3. How can the Filipino diaspora affect the ongoing insurgency problems in 
the Philippines? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Insurgency, or internal war, according to O’Neill is a “general overarching concept 
that refers to conflict between a government and an out group or opponent in which the 
latter use [s] both political resources and violence to change, reformulate or uphold the 
legitimacy of key aspect of politics.”7 This emphasizes that an insurgency is foremost 
political in nature, an idea to which various scholars subscribe; Taber defines it as “the 
extension of politics by means of armed conflict” while Galula stresses it as a “political 
war.”8 The goal is to first win the support of the population to ensure its active participation 
and consent. To borrow Mao’s phrase, the “population can be compared to a pond where 
the fish [in this case, the insurgents] can swim.”9 The wider and deeper the support, the 
more space and freedom the insurgency has to operate. The CPP adopted this concept 
because of its proven effectiveness. 
Since the population is fundamental to the conflict’s outcome, it is essential for the 
insurgents to convert as many people as possible to embrace the cause of the movement at 
                                                 
7 Bard E. O’Neill, “Foreword,” in War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare, ed. Robert 
Taber (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), viii. 
8 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 
2002), 18; David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, PSI Classics of the 
Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 4. 
9 Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, FMFRP 12–18 (Washington, DC: Marine 
Corps, 1989), 8. 
4 
an early stage and to establish a base of support.10 Insurgents, to some extent, must be 
propagandists, agitators, and organizers to effectively influence the people to join or 
support the cause.11 And in places where they have relative control and an organized 
population, a base of support is easy to establish, which can be utilized to extend their 
influence in neighboring areas and replicate the earlier process.12 This pattern of 
developing a base of support resembles Mao Tse Tung’s approach of controlling the 
countryside first and absorbing the outlying areas, until the urban center is encircled.13 The 
communist insurgency in the Philippines follows a similar pattern of initially establishing 
a mass base. 
At the same time, as the insurgents established their base of support, the party, being 
“the basic instrument for the [insurgents’] entire process,” is built, developed, and 
strengthened.14 During this stage, insurgents must be inconspicuous in building their base, 
the party, and armed insurgents so as not to “appear as [a] serious challenge to the 
counterinsurgent [government forces].”15 However, the insurgents, knowing that armed 
conflict is inevitable, will still hold off, which as Arreguin-Toft notes is to their advantage: 
“In asymmetric conflict, delay favors the weak.”16 But for those who opt to fight, 
engagement must be employed only as an educational tool and propaganda for the 
insurgency forces.17 The Communist Party of the Philippines has employed these tactics 
and procedures. 
                                                 
10 At the early stage, insurgents focus on base building by politicizing and mobilizing the people to 
freely support the movement, portraying it as the “Peoples War.” See Corpus, Silent War, 25. 
11 Taber, War of the Flea, 12. 
12 Corpus, Silent War, 34. 
13 Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, 21. 
14 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 30. 
15 Galula, 6. 
16 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars,” International Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128. 
17 Taber, War of the Flea, 27. 
5 
Another dimension of an insurgency is the establishment of a united front, a means 
of marshalling allies around the party;18 these are organizations whose primary purpose is 
to provide cover for the insurgent, composed of different sectors of society.19 As a political 
tool, these organizations use the economic and social dimensions to foment social unrest 
that discredits the government, encouraging sympathy for the insurgency. One example is 
highlighting students and workers staging rallies and strikes, which news outlets pick up 
as a sign of unrest and anarchy. This may seem trivial, but it can have huge impact on the 
economy and on international perceptions. It can put pressure on the government so that it 
loses its will to fight because of losing popular support. This scenario corroborates Mack’s 
idea that “success for the insurgent arises not from the military victory on the ground . . . 
but rather from the progressive attrition of their opponents’ political capability to wage 
war.”20 
The NDF is the CCP’s united front in the Philippines. It serves as its “major 
umbrella organization,” supervising sympathetic non-communist organizations and 
alliances.21 By providing support and protection to the insurgency directly or indirectly, 
these alliances seek to undermine the government’s political, economic, and social 
functions. The NDF also serves as a conduit for the NPA’s numerous underground 
organizations by linking them to a network of legal organizations with similar goals and 
views at the regional and national levels.22 The NDF’s role can be compared to a shield 
that protects and safeguards the CPP and NPA.23 
                                                 
18 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 31. 
19 Taber, War of the Flea, 24. 
20 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (1975): 175–200, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009880. 
21 Jose Magno and A. Gregor, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Philippines,” Asian Survey 
26, no. 5 (1986): 501. 
22 An example was the National Association of Peasants in the early 1970s, an underground peasant 
union supporting the NPA and allied with the NDF. See Francisco Lara and Horacio R. Morales, “The 
Peasant Movement and the Challenge of Rural Democratisation in the Philippines,” Journal of 
Development Studies 26, no. 4 (1990): 153, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220389008422177. 
23 Corpus, Silent War, 56. 
6 
The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the establishment of party-list 
organizations, “political parties representing marginalized sectors of the society such as 
workers, and peasants.”24 These provide insurgents with a legal gateway to infiltrate the 
political system.25 The CPP, through the NDF, set up Bayan Muna, a political party that 
participated in the first party list election in 2001.26 The success of Bayan Muna 
encouraged the NDF to establish numerous political parties that gained seats in the 
Philippine Congress; they have been supporting the interests of the communist movement 
since then.27 And these parties are often viewed by senior government officials as “part of 
the insurgency.”28 Holden quotes a former Philippine national security adviser who said, 
“We are no longer dealing with a traditional guerrilla campaign; these guerillas have 
infiltrated our democratic process.”29 This is one of the many ways that the NDF has aided 
the CPP to attain its goal of overthrowing the Philippine government.  
The communist struggle in the Philippines has endured for 50 years without, for the 
most part, relying on external assistance.30 Limited international support came from 
European solidarity groups that channeled funds through the NDF’s international head 
office at Utrecht—which, notably, is where the exiled CCP founding chairman Jose Maria 
Sison now lives.31 Scholars debate the importance of external assistance to insurgencies. 
Jeffrey Record argues, “External assistance may be required to convert superior will to 
                                                 
24 William N. Holden, “Ashes from the Phoenix: State Terrorism and the Party-List Groups in the 
Philippines,” Contemporary Politics 15, no. 4 (2009): 381, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770903416422. 
25 Holden, 381. 
26 Dominique Caouette, Stephan Feuchtwang, and Alpa Shah, “Ups and Downs of a Contemporary 
Maoist Movement: Shifting Tactics, Moving Targets and (Un)Orthodox Strategy: The Philippine 
Revolution in Perspective,” in Emancipatory Politics: A Critique (Open Anthropology Cooperative Press, 
2015), 154. 
27 Caouette, Feuchtwang, and Shah, 136. 
28 Holden, “Ashes from the Phoenix,” 385. 
29 Holden, 385. 
30 Initially, China tried to supply firearms, but they were intercepted. CPP leadership sought the 
support of the Soviet Union in 1987, but support waned as Moscow advanced relations with the United 
States. See Alvin H. Bernstein and Armando B. Heredia, “Communist Insurgency in the Philippines,” 
Comparative Strategy 8, no. 3 (1989): 279–295, https://doi.org/10.108/01495938908402784. 
31 Bernstein and Heredia, 291. 
7 
victory.”32 According to Galula, it is unnecessary in the early stages of an insurgency, but 
as guerilla warfare transforms into a higher form of warfare, it is definitely helpful.33 As 
early as 1991, the NDF affirmed that it had “gained the support of organizations, political 
parties, and liberation movements in over twenty-six countries in Europe, North America, 
Asia Pacific, Latin America and Africa.”34 What could be the NDF’s goal in gaining 
international support? Was it the result of lessons learned from Hukbong Bayan Laban sa 
Hapon (HUKBALAP)’s failure?35 The HUKBALAHAP, according to Galula, failed to 
develop due to lack of external support.36 
External support received by insurgents, based on recent studies, can have a 
profound effect on an insurgency war.37 According to Salehyan, Gleditsh, and 
Cunningham, “Civil wars with outside involvement . . . typically last longer, cause more 
fatalities, and are more difficult to resolve through negotiation.”38 This study, however, 
centers on formal “state sponsorship,” which has provided outside assistance to numerous 
insurgencies. But at the end of the Cold War, the characteristics of external support and the 
personality of the benefactors changed dramatically so that the external support was no 
longer limited to state sponsors.39 Diaspora and other non-state actors, such as “refugees, 
foreign guerilla movements, religious organizations, wealthy individuals,” and advocacy 
                                                 
32 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Strong Lose,” Parameters 35, no. 4 (Winter 2005–2006), EBSCO. 
33 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 26. 
34 Edwin J. Ruiz Lester, “After National Democracy: Radical Democratic Politics at the Edge of 
Modernity,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 16, no. 2 (1991): 182, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
030437549101600204. 
35 The HUKBALAP or Nation’s Army against the Japanese Soldiers was a communist organization 
defeated by government forces in 1955. See Christopher Paul, Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case 
Studies, RR-291/2-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 31. 
36 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 27. 
37 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining External 
Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65, no. 4 (2011): 710, https://doi.org/10. 
1017/S0020818311000233. 
38 Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, 710. 
39 Superpowers or state-supporting insurgencies were common during the Cold War, often changing 
local conflicts into international contests. See Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent 
Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001). 
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groups, have emerged, all offering to lend their support to insurgencies.40 The influence 
and roles of these new external supporters of insurgencies vary, depending on the insurgent 
needs and the context of the struggles being promoted.41 
Diasporas have been recently recognized as an emerging player in providing 
various types of supports to their homeland’s insurgents.42 This support includes publicity 
and propaganda, donating funds and sometimes becoming the de facto representative to the 
diaspora’s host country.43 Strong kinship ties and the feelings of compassion toward their 
fellow countrymen who are left behind and suffering from domestic struggles are two 
common motivations that lead members of these migrant communities to help 
insurgencies.44 A diaspora, according to Ricardo Hausmann, “is often a reminder of a 
country’s darker moment” since most migration happens during times of civil wars and 
political and economic turmoil.45 This social unrest can evoke strong connections and 
feelings of empathy for migrant communities toward the armed struggle in their homeland. 
Byman et al. suggest, “Diaspora may become more important to insurgencies in the future 
because they are more reliable in funding and do not seek to exert control over a movement, 
and insurgencies have an already-established bond with immigrant communities that they 
can exploit.”46 
The recently published 2016 CPP Constitution and Program outline the role of ISW, 
namely to “arouse, organize, and mobilize Filipinos compatriots abroad” to directly 
participate in the insurgency and “work for recognition of the status of belligerency” of the 
                                                 
40 Byman et al., xvi. 
41 Byman et al., xix. 
42 Byman et al., 41. 
43 Byman et al., 41. 
44 Byman et al., 55. 
45 Ricardo Hausmann, “The Diaspora Goldmine,” Project Syndicate, June 25, 2015, https://www. 
project-syndicate.org/commentary/remittances-not-only-benefit-to-homeland-economies-by-ricardo-
hausmann-2015-06. 
46 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, xv. 
9 
insurgency movement.47 ISW tactics are similar to those of NDF maneuvers, infiltrating 
or recruiting first non-communist but sympathetic organizations or persons to the cause 
who can then later be mobilized to support the movement.48 Could this be the reason why 
left-leaning political parties such as Gabriela and Migrante established international 
offices, to mimic the NDF at the international level? What are the other reasons for 
establishing ISW aside from seeking assistance in the international community for the 
advancement of the movement? Is ISW trying to mobilize overseas Filipino workers 
(OFW) or the Filipino diaspora?49 Or is it part of elevating the conflict to the realm of 
diplomacy and international propaganda? Another question concerns the security 
implication of these NDF international organizations to the current security challenges of 
the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea. These are some of the gaps about ISW that this 
study tries to address. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study draws on Gordon McCormick’s diamond model to examine the role of 
ISW and its effect on counterinsurgency (COIN).50 The model, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
provides a paradigm for optimizing COIN operations by holistically addressing all aspects 
                                                 
47 By achieving the status of belligerency, the CPP can gain diplomatic and trade relations with other 
countries as well as enjoy some of the privileges accorded a normal state in the United Nations and 
international organizations. See “CPP Constitution and Program,” Philippine Revolution Web Central, 
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49 The term overseas Filipino worker (OFW) is used to denote Filipino labor migrants who, according 
to Semyonov and Gorodzeisky, “leave their countries of origin in search of temporary job [s] to help 
support the household members left behind, with no real intention to make the country of destination their 
home.” See Moshe Semyonov and Anastasia Gorodzeisky, “Occupational Destinations and Economic 
Mobility of Filipino Overseas Workers,” International Migration Review 38, no. 1 (2004): 8, https://doi. 
org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00186.x. According to 2015 data from the Philippine Statistical Authority, 
there are 9.1 million Filipinos overseas, and approximately 5,000 leave the Philippines every day. See 
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Data” (presentation at the UN Regional Workshop on Strengthening the Collection and Use of International 
Migration Data, Bangkok, Thailand, 2017), https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/meetings/2017/ 
bangkok--international-migration-data/Session%203/Session%203%20Philippines.pdf. 
50 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare 18, no. 2 (September 
2005): 2–13, ProQuest. 
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of conflicts.51 Moreover, it explicitly underscores the international actors’ role in COIN, 
often minimized in the literature. By drawing on this model, this study can explore the 
possible link between ISW and international actors and how ISW can influence other actors 
highlighted in the model. Moreover, the model serves as a guide in analyzing the dynamics 
of the different actors, particularly ISW, in the current COIN campaign of the Philippine 
government. 
 
Figure 1. Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model52 
The four points of the diamond represent the various actors involved in insurgency 
and counterinsurgency: the people (population), the government, the counter-government, 
and the international actor.53 The population is located at the top, signifying its importance, 
and the government and the counter-government, which constantly seek to win the 
                                                 
51 Wendt, 5. 
52 Adapted from Wendt, 6. 
53 Jonathan P. Hastings and Krishnamurti A. Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm: Getting It 
Right in the Philippines” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 23. 
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population’s support, are located on either side of the diamond directly below the people.54 
Finally, international actors, which are other states and international organizations, are 
located at the bottom. The line between any two actors indicates they will likely interact, 
and the various legs indicate the order by which the government should engage the other 
actors.55 The model is useful because it highlights the importance of international actors 
in the insurgency. 
Doug McAdam’s political process model is also used to analyze and assess ISW’s 
role.56 The model (see Figure 2) identifies the factors that need to be in place for a social 
movement, such as insurgency, to emerge: expanding political opportunities, indigenous 
organizational strength, and the development of insurgent consciousness.57 Expanding 
political opportunities are a “relatively long-term social processes yield shifts in the 
political status quo, which are in effect changes in the opportunity structure.”58 Indigenous 
organizational strength refers to how an aggrieved or discontent population uses existing 
resources to improve its prospect as a result of adjustment in the political structure.59 What 
the model highlights is that these resources must reach a point where the population is 
willing to act. Finally, the development of an insurgent consciousness directly results from 
the expansion of political opportunities and the increase in organizational strength and is 
the collective belief of the aggrieved population, that “change is not only necessary, but 
possible.”60 The model is of interest here because it highlights the importance of 
organizations in the furtherance of a social movement—in this case, an insurgency. 
                                                 
54 Hastings and Mortela, 23. 
55 Hastings and Mortela, 23. 
56 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985) 
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Figure 2. Doug McAdam’s Political Process Model61 
Historical and comparative research complements the diamond model and explores 
the possible role and influence of ISW in the insurgency movement. The role of the Tamil 
diaspora in the insurgency waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) against 
the government of Sri Lanka is used as a case study.62 Despite the LTTE’s defeat in 2009, 
the Sri Lankan government believes that Tamils living abroad are still committed to and 
supportive of the call for a separate state.63 Another example is the case of Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka, or the Free Aceh Movement, an Indonesian separatist movement that has 
received support from Acehnese living overseas.64  
                                                 
61 Adapted from Borer, Everton, and Nayve. 
62 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” February 23, 2010, 
24, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-ltte. 
63 International Crisis Group, 24. 
64 Antje Missbach, “The Waxing and Waning of the Acehnese Diaspora’s Long-Distance Politics,” 
Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 3 (2013): 1055–1082, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X12000571. 
13 
II. THEORIES AND MODELS  
This chapter discusses two models: Doug McAdam’s political process model and 
Gordon McCormick’s diamond model. These models provide the frameworks and help 
guide the analyses of the case studies presented in the following chapter. Moreover, by 
using these two models, the study hopes to see patterns of explanations that will answer 
the research question, What is the role of diaspora in insurgency and its effect on counter 
insurgency? 
A. THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
The political process model explains the emergence of an insurgency on the basis 
of convergence and dynamics of different external and internal factors relative to the 
movement’s formation.65 It subscribes to the idea that a social movement is a political, not 
a psychological, occurrence.66 Thus, all elements that have influence in the established 
political activities can be utilized to explain social insurgency.67 Moreover, the model 
considers movements to be “a continuous process from generation to decline, rather than a 
discrete series of developmental stages.”68 And, according to McAdam, “any complete 
model of social insurgency should offer a framework in analyzing the entire process of 
movement development rather than a particular phase of the same process.”69 
The political process model reflects a Marxist influence in that it acknowledges 
“the power disparity between elites and excluded groups” as significant and an unavoidable 
state of affairs.70 What is unavoidable, according to this idea, is the succession to power 
by the masses as the elites’ influence lessens.71 Another notable Marxist influence 
                                                 
65 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 2. 
66 McAdam, 36. 
67 McAdam, 36. 
68 McAdam, 36. 
69 McAdam, 36. 
70 McAdam, 37. 
71 McAdam, 37. 
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reflected in the model is a concept of “subjective process in the generation of 
insurgency.”72 This concept describes the transformation of an insurgent consciousness, 
initially from a feeling of powerlessness among its members to the realization of a group’s 
potential to pursue a social movement. 
McAdam defines a social movement as the “rational attempt by excluded groups to 
mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through 
noninstitutionalized means.”73 Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper draw on Sidney Tarrow’s 
mobilization definition, arguing it is “a form of association as collective challenges by 
people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents 
and authorities—challenges that employ disruptive direct action against elite authorities, 
other groups or cultural codes.”74 Either one works with the political process model. Of 
more importance are the three sets of factors that the model identifies as crucial to the 
development of a social insurgency. Each factor is necessary but insufficient to trigger a 
social movement alone.75 It is only through their dynamic combinations that a potential 
insurgency can prosper. 
1. Expanding Political Opportunities 
Any prospective social movement will initially face serious challenges before it can 
successfully mobilize due to its weak and limited bargaining position. Overcoming these 
disadvantages requires the exploitation of any possible political opportunities that will help 
increase its political leverage. Moreover, according to Dan Meyer, “The key recognition in 
the political opportunity is that activist’s prospects for advancing particular claims, 
mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent.”76 Tarrow defines 
political opportunities as “those dimensions of the political environment that provide 
                                                 
72 McAdam, 38. 
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incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for 
success and failure.”77 Examples of the insurgents’ expanding political opportunities 
include political instability, an enhanced political position of the aggrieved population, 
ideological openness, and threats (see Figure 3).78 
 
Figure 3. Expanded Political Process Model79 
Political opportunities appear when any events or broad socio-economic processes 
challenge the structured political establishment.80 According to McAdam, “Among events 
and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo are wars, international 
political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic 
changes.”81 Such changes can become a great equalizer; in an instant they can reverse an 
existing state of affairs. They can cause political instability, which can weaken the existing 
political order and motivate a group to mobilize and fight for a new political order.82 And 
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during the ongoing changes of events and developing social processes, an aggrieved 
population can advance and enhance its political position over time.83 Once in a position 
of power, the risks associated with the movement’s participation lessen, giving the 
insurgents relative freedom to promote ideological openness or alternative ideas related to 
the movement’s objectives.84  
2. Increase Indigenous Organizational Strength  
A favorable political atmosphere provides only an opportunity for an insurgent 
movement to mobilize successfully.85 And such opportunities can only be exploited if 
needed resources support the insurgent movement. According to McAdam, “To generate a 
social movement, the aggrieved population must be able to ‘convert’ a favorable ‘structure 
of political opportunities’ into an organized campaign of social protest.”86 This means that 
an insurgent movement needs to have indigenous “infrastructure” capable of unifying 
members of the aggrieved population or an established “associational network” for “an 
organized campaign of mass political action.”87 The following four resources are crucial 
to organizational strength: social movement organizations, social networks, material 
resources, and free spaces. 
First, a social movement organization is defined as “a complex or formal 
organization which identifies its goals with the preference of social movement or a 
countermovement and attempt to implements its goals.”88 It include leadership, cadres, 
constituents, members, formal and informal structures, processes, tactics, and a strategy.89 
An emerging organization can initially affiliate with existing organizations for assistance 
in establishing networks, setting up the organization, and providing people and resources 
                                                 
83 Borer, Everton, and Nayve, “Global Development and Human (In)Security.” 
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during mobilization. Second, a social network is “a set of actors”—which could refer to 
discrete individuals, subgroups, organizations, communities and nation states and so on, 
involved in social relation—“that share ties with one another.”90 Through their existing 
networks of ties incipient organizations can obtain resources essential for their 
development such as information, contacts, communications, and funding. Third, material 
resources are tangible resources like funding, labor, organizational infrastructure, 
administrative and logistical requirements, and other support facilities or infrastructures.91 
By securing these material resources, a budding organization can efficiently perform its 
routine operations. Finally, free spaces are areas or zones where a social movement is 
unrestricted and state interference is limited, such as meeting places, safe houses, social 
media sites, and overseas support groups. The free zone helps an organization to conduct 
activities necessary for its development without restriction or free from government 
persecution. According to McAdam, “Insurgent groups must be able to exploit the initial 
successes of the movement to mobilize those resources needed to facilitate the 
development of a more permanent organizational structure required to sustain 
insurgency.”92  
3. Development of an Insurgent Consciousness 
The combination of both political opportunities and organizational strength is 
necessary but not enough to cause a social movement.93 It only creates an opening, and it 
all depends on the insurgents’ seizing that chance—if the prospect is worthy of the 
movement’s goal.94 The “transformation of consciousness”—a state where people as a 
group collectively develop an awareness of their plight and the idea that collectively they 
can act to change their predicament—must occur first before a protest movement can 
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92 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 54. 
93 McAdam, 48. 
94 Edwards, Social Movements and Protest, 91. 
18 
emerge.95 Christian Smith has called this transformation “the development of insurgent 
consciousness.”96 Drawing on McAdam, Smith argues that it is a “collective state of 
understanding that perceives, interprets and explains a social situation in such way that it 
compels people to organize and act in order to change the social situation.”97 A social 
movement must construct and communicate the insurgency’s ideas and what it stands for, 
if it is to influence audiences to act and become involved with the movement.  
This occurs through cultural framing processes, which is where the movement’s 
broader ideology or key ideas are repackaged into a bumper-sticker version or an image 
and symbol for easy identification.98 Framing involves presenting and conveying “action 
oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that call forth and legitimize social movement 
activities and campaign.”99 Social movement leaders must constantly manufacture and 
sustain themes or meaning through framing if they are to actively engage constituents, 
antagonists, and bystanders.100 And this requires paying attention to the core framing tasks 
of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing.101 Diagnostic framing analyzes the 
cause of the problems requiring change and to whom blame will be attributed.”102 It 
answers the questions “What went wrong?” and “Who or what is to blame?”103 Prognostic 
framing focuses on examining possible remedies or solutions for achieving a social 
movement’s objective.104 It helps answers the question “What is to be done?”105 Finally, 
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motivational framing provides motives or rationale inspiring people to strongly commit to 
the collective action, overcome the fear of risk related to joining the movement, and solve 
the problem of the “free rider.”106 It answers the question “Why must we act about it?” 
and overrides the temptation of members of the aggrieved group to free-ride on the efforts 
of others.107 
4. Summary 
To summarize, the political process model recognizes three sets of factors critical 
to the development of social insurgency: political opportunities and threats, resource 
mobilization, and the framing of grievances. Political opportunities and threats are the 
conditions that incentivize people to undertake collective action with the possibility of 
increasing their political leverage, which presents new chances for the group to succeed 
and prosper. Resource mobilization provides the needed infrastructure to acquire resources 
to sustain the insurgency movement until the formal organization is established. Framing 
grievances presents identifiable narratives of beliefs and ideas where prospective members 
can relate and force themselves to commit and make necessary actions for the movement’s 
objectives. Each factor is necessary, but for an insurgent movement to prosper, a collective 
presence is essential.  
B. GORDON MCCORMICK’S DIAMOND MODEL 
Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model provides a framework for examining the 
actions of different players and strategies in an insurgency. With a clear understanding of 
the dynamics and roles of players in relation to each other, and in reference to their strategy, 
planners can work toward a more coherent, holistic strategy. The diamond model itself is 
also a tool for evaluating the relative advantages and disadvantages of a given strategy. 
Therefore, in using the model, potential weaknesses in a COIN strategy can be identified 
and corrected at an early stage.  
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1. The Players 
This sub-section provides brief descriptions of key players relevant to insurgency 
and COIN: populations, government, insurgents, and external actors.  
a. The Population  
The population (people) refer to the individuals of a family, group, organization, 
clan, tribe, village, or community at any given place or territory. According to McCormick 
and Giordano, the “population is divided into conditional and unconditional 
participants.”108 Unconditional participants are usually the small mobilizable portion of 
the population considered “hard core” supporters of both the government and the 
insurgents.109 Conditional participants, on the other hand, “are the large middle group of 
individuals who are prepared to support one side or the other depending on the result of the 
struggle.”110 Both the government and insurgents vie to obtain the support of this large 
middle group of individuals.  
b. The Government  
The government is the main COIN force competing against the insurgents. It can 
employ various elements of national power in an integrated, synchronized fashion to 
maintain its political authority. A government has everything at its disposal at the start of 
an insurgency. These government assets include “diplomatic recognition; legitimate 
executive power, legislative, and judiciary branches; control of administration and police; 
financial resources; industrial and agricultural resources; transportation and 
communication facilities; use and control of information and propaganda media; command 
of the armed forces and the possibility of increasing its size.”111 
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c. The Insurgency 
The insurgency or counter-government is a group of people or organization with an 
intent to “destroy an existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a 
completely new state structure.”112 Aside from engaging guerilla warfare against the 
government, an insurgency also conducts political mobilization and other related works to 
attract assistance from abroad.113 An insurgent organization normally emerges from a core 
group of activists.114 To understand the insurgency’s roles in the model, one must examine 
“its origin organization, nature of its support, the movement’s governing doctrine and 
theory of victory and the character of its rural and urban campaign.”115  
d. The International Actors  
International actors are external players that have the capability of aiding either the 
insurgency or the government. International actors include states and non-state actors, such 
as diaspora, refugees, foreign guerilla movements, religious organizations, international 
organizations, and wealthy individuals.116 Support from international actors could be in 
the form of moral, political, technical, financial, or military support.117 Political support is 
any diplomatic action that can put pressure on the government or insurgents, such as 
severing diplomatic relations or refusing to recognize them in an international forum.118 
International actors provide moral support by expressing public sympathy and opinions 
through communication media.119 Technical support is any form of advice that can 
relatively improve organizational, strategic, political, and military operations.120 Financial 
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support is monetary assistance that can be either overt or covert.121 Military support can 
occur through direct intervention or by offering safe havens or training facilities.122 
2. The Strategies 
The diamond model graphically depicts players’ relationships with one another, so 
planners or policy makers can determine available strategies. In Figure 4, Leg 1 (the line 
between the government and the people) represents possible government actions or policies 
to engage the people. In a similar manner, Leg 2 (the line between the people and 
insurgents) denotes the insurgents’ efforts and activities designed to entice the people to 
join the insurgency movement. But through the implementation of a viable strategy, the 
government can disrupt insurgent efforts in Leg 2, as both Leg 1 and Leg 2 are within the 
Internal Environment space (the upper half of the diamond model). The Internal 
Environment is the area where both government and insurgents battle for the population to 
achieve legitimacy. Leg 4 and Leg 5, on the other hand, are in the External Environment 
space, which is the arena of competition for the support of international actors. Leg 3 lies 
in between and captures interaction between the government and the insurgents. 
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Figure 4. Gordon McCormick’s Diamond Model 
Figure 5 illustrates possible strategies available to the state and to insurgents. Using 
the arrow to depict strategy, both the government and insurgents have an interest in gaining 
the support of both the people and various international actors. As the model suggests, both 
sides share similar objectives. However, their actual strategies differ. The model displays 
five strategies: gaining the population support (blue and red #1 arrows); disrupting the 
opponent’s bid for support from the population (blue and red #2 arrows); direct action 
against the opponent (blue and red #3 arrows); establishing ties with international actors 
(blue and red #5 arrows); and disrupting the opponent’s ties with international actors (blue 
and red #4 arrows).123 
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Figure 5. Possible Strategies in Gordon McCormick’s Diamond 
Model124 
a. Strategy 1: Gaining Population Support 
For this strategy, the government’s goal is to maintain its legitimacy and control 
over the population.125 To sustain legitimacy, a government must perform its mandated 
functions and provide good governance, such as taking care of the people’s well-being, 
providing infrastructure and economic development, maintaining peace and order, and 
safeguarding individuals’ rights and liberties. A government can attain legitimacy if the 
majority of the population freely supports and participates in its programs. 
For an insurgency to survive during its earliest stage—when it is typically weak—
it must establish a base of support, conventionally in the countryside together with a 
handful of selected cadres. It is from these bases where recruitment, indoctrination of 
members, organizational expansion, and trainings happened. The expansion and 
development of a guerilla base of support, membership, other affiliated organizations, and 
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the insurgent armed group without government interference over time are strong indicators 
of the insurgents’ success in this strategy. 
b. Strategy 2: Disrupt the Opponent’s Bid for Population Support 
The strategy requires the government to address the root causes of the insurgency 
because the problem is as “much a political one as a military one.”126 To destroy the 
insurgents’ political base, the government must first eliminate “the sources of popular 
unrest through broad based policy of social and political reform.”127 McCormick 
emphasizes that “the military in this scheme would play a secondary role in defeating the 
insurgency by permitting the government to clear and hold rural areas long enough to ‘win 
the hearts and minds’ of the local inhabitants.”128 An effective employment of this strategy 
should yield actionable intelligence that can help identify the insurgency’s members, 
infrastructure, and front organization. 
For the insurgents, their front organizations are established to operate openly and 
be “part of ‘a broad mobilization’ to get ‘deep into the heart of the masses,’ to ‘agitate,’ 
and to ‘open the Party’ and ‘help prepare for the beginning of the popular war.’”129 The 
intent of this strategy is to provoke the government and the military to commit repression 
against the people.130 Such a move would “polarize society, further undermine the popular 
trust in the regime and swell the ranks in the movements supporters, all of which will be 
preconditions to victory.”131 For the insurgent, a successful outcome for this strategy 
means growing popular unrest against the government and a strengthening of the 
insurgency movement. 
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c. Strategy 3: Direct Action against the Opponent 
A government needs a coherent national strategy to combat an insurgency. Direct 
action is not limited to military operations where doctrine, capabilities, equipment, and 
trainings are reconfigured for COIN. It also includes the employment of other forms of 
state power. Enacting laws that make membership, entities supporting the insurgency 
movement, and the inciting or encouraging of terrorism criminal offenses can be a form of 
direct action.132 A successful strategy can neutralize the insurgent propaganda and armed 
struggle. 
Using this strategy, insurgents use force only for the purpose of psychological 
effect. Although poorly armed, they can utilize various guerilla tactics such as ambush, 
raids, sabotage, and assassination of officials to compensate for their shortcomings, inflict 
casualties, and exert maximum damage against the government. Such tactics often force a 
military to be on the defensive and adopt a reactionary posture.  
d. Strategy 4: Disrupt the Opponent’s Link to International Actors  
The government, using its existing diplomatic ties with the international 
community, carries out internationally accepted activities such as public diplomacy and 
information caravans to prevent or disrupt the insurgency from establishing international 
connections and support. The end state of these activities is to confine the insurgency 
problem within the country’s territorial limits, where the state can employ and maximize 
its potential power. The insurgents, on the other hand, will campaign to discredit the 
government for the purpose of severing their ties with the international community, 
especially with those that support the ongoing COIN effort. The presence of an 
international observer or critic sometimes restricts or inhibits COIN operations. 
e. Strategy 5: Establish a Link with International Actors 
Like Strategy 1, both the government and the insurgency will try to gain popular 
support, except here the goal is to gain access and solicit support from international actors. 
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The government already has diplomatic ties; its goal is to secure consent and support in the 
ongoing COIN operations. The insurgency, on the other hand, initially seeks recognition 
and possible support from international actors other than the state. It may establish ties with 
international organizations with similar agendas to shift its grievances from the local to the 
international level. By gaining outside help, the insurgency can acquire opportunities like 
free spaces or international protection, so it can pursue its goals unhampered by COIN 
forces.  
3. Summary 
In summary, McCormick’s diamond model provides a framework that illustrates 
possible strategies a government or an insurgency can undertake to win the support of the 
population and various international actors. Although both share similar goals, their 
strategies to undermine their opponent’s bid to dominate the internal and external 
environment space depends on the resources and opportunities they have. Disrupting an 
opponent’s strategy undercuts the adversary from achieving its objectives while creates 
leverage that diminishes one’s disadvantages. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented and explained the political process and diamond models. 
The frameworks provided by both are utilized in the next chapter as a guide for cases in 
which diasporas have supported insurgencies. The political process model highlights the 
three essential factors needed for an insurgency movement to flourish in the face of socio-
economic events that disrupt the prevailing condition of the society. The first factor 
involves political opportunities or threats. These are a set of external conditions that 
incentivize, or disincentivize, an incipient movement to carry out collective action. The 
second factor is mobilizing resources. These include material resources, social movement 
organizations, social networks, and free spaces, which provide logistical requirements and 
a safe area needed by the organization in its day-to-day operations. Finally, the framing of 
grievances highlights the formation of insurgent consciousness and answers the following 
questions: What went wrong? What is to be done? and Why must we act? These three 
factors are used in analyzing the formation of a diaspora. The diamond model, on the other 
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hand, underscores the international actors’ role in COIN and how both the government and 
insurgents vie for their support. The analysis focuses on the role and effects of a diaspora 
being an international actor. Drawing on this model guides the analysis of how the diaspora 
is used in a strategy. The goal of using the model is to explore the possible link between 
the diaspora and insurgency, and how it can influence other actors in the model as well.  
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III. CASE STUDIES 
Chapter III explores two case studies: the Tamil diaspora of Sri Lanka and the 
Acehnese diaspora of Aceh Indonesia. Both supported insurgencies in various ways for 
more than two decades with mixed outcomes. Each case is analyzed to derive tentative 
conclusions about the role of a diaspora and its effect on insurgency movements and COIN 
operations.  
A. SRI LANKA’S TAMIL DIASPORA 
This section considers the role and influence of the Tamil diaspora in Sri Lanka’s 
conflict. The focus of the analysis is to determine the diaspora’s support and value to the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the main insurgent movement in Sri Lanka. Part 
of the analysis is determines how the Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE despite 
its perceived superiority. The case is organized into the following subsections: origin of 
the conflict, the players involved in the conflict, analysis of the case, and conclusion.  
1. Origin of the Conflict 
When Ceylon—as Sri Lanka was formerly known—gained its independence in 
1948, tension was already simmering between the two major ethnics groups in the country, 
the Sinhalese and the Tamils, “over the distribution of the resources and goods, and the 
ideological direction of the country.”133 Even before gaining independence, the Buddhist 
Sinhalese resented the Hindu Tamils because the Tamil minority (12.7 percent of Sri 
Lanka’s population) occupied more positions in civil and military services.134 The Tamils, 
on the other hand, were skeptical of the Sinhalese majority rule, and policies and programs 
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of which were perceived to be discriminatory to minorities (and especially to the Tamil 
population).135 Each side “felt itself to be the genuinely aggrieved party.”136 
In the early 1950s, Sinhalese Buddhist cultural nationalism underwent a major 
revival of which Sinhalese nationalists took advantage.137 By employing nationalist 
rhetoric to win a “large constituency of politically enfranchised Sinhalese from the lower 
class,” Sinhalese politicians dominated Sri Lankan politics.138 Discriminatory policies 
included the “Sinhala Only Language Act,” which provoked an impassioned Tamil 
response.139 The Sri Lankan government also imposed several policies to diminish the 
Tamils’ representation in universities, the civil service, and military organizations. By the 
1960s, the nationalist government had successfully transformed the armed forces into “a 
Buddhist Sinhalese entity,” and the Sinhalese had monopoly control of the private and 
public sectors.140 The resulting powerlessness of Tamil political groups and their later 
expulsion from the Sri Lankan parliament led to the formation of extremism.141 
2. The Players 
As mentioned earlier, the actions and roles of different players are discussed to 
provide a clear understanding of how they contributed to the dynamics of the insurgency 
and COIN in the Sri Lankan conflict. This sub-section describes the following players: 
insurgents, the government, and the Tamil diaspora. 
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a. Insurgents 
The adoption of the 1972 constitution conferred the preeminence of Buddhism in 
Sri Lanka, which further discriminated against Tamils as second-class citizens and pushed 
them to form the Tamil United Front (TUF).142 The TUF, which in 1976 became the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF), subscribed to the idea of “militant separatism based on 
the first millennium Chola Empire,” whose state symbol was the tiger.143 TULF, an 
alliance of radical Tamil groups, promoted “Tamil Eelam,” or Tamil independent state, by 
means of armed struggle.144 Initially, several groups claimed to stand for the revolutionary 
cause, but according to Paul Moorcraft, only five groups could effectively represent Tamil 
Eelam.145 By 1980, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam became the dominant 
independence movement, absorbing all other revolutionary groups either through 
persuasion or by force.146 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, or VP, founded LTTE in 1976. According to M. R. 
Narayan Swamy, “VP considered himself the messiah of the Tamils—and the man 
ordained to decide the future of the community.”147 VP was passionate about the 
establishment of a Tamil nation and the need to secede from Sinhalese-majority Sri Lanka. 
Secession, apparently in VP’s view, could only be achieved through the “primacy of the 
gun.”148 He was ruthless; anyone who disagreed with him was considered an opponent to 
the Tamils’ cause, branded a traitor, and condemned to death.149 But despite VP’s violent 
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nature, he transformed the LTTE from a handful of members to a formidable insurgent 
group. The following is Swamy’s description of the LTTE during its peak: 
The Tigers were unusual cocktails of classical insurgency and sheer terror. 
Besides being the only insurgent outfit to own a shipping fleet, the LTTE 
had its own army, a small but lethal naval wing, a nascent air force, artillery 
units, a feared intelligence wing, a police force, a clandestine radio, and an 
efficient logistic division to buy and ferry war material from around the 
world in the most secretive and sophisticated manner. The group [‘]s 
tentacle [s] reached almost every country. . . . The LTTE’s ability to kill any 
person, in the military or the government, inevitably dented the state’s 
counterinsurgency, making Prabhakaran look exactly like his childhood 
comic hero—the Phantom, the masked jungle hero who could never be 
vanquished.150 
b. Government 
As the LTTE emerged, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, although they had experience 
in COIN, were ill equipped to fight the threat.151 Initially, the Sri Lankan military 
employed a conventional strategy, focusing on a single objective that produced limited 
success.152 From 1976, several Sri Lankan governments tried different means to destroy 
the LTTE, which had become more resilient over time. When Mahinda Rajapaksa assumed 
the presidency in 2005, the LTTE destruction became his government’s foremost 
objective.153 
The Sri Lankan government during the Rajapaksa term displayed political will 
unlike the earlier governments, which were described as “weak, indecisive and disunited 
vis-à-vis the LTTE.”154 Moreover, the country actively pursued regional and international 
engagement to seek assistance in its campaign against the LTTE.155 Rajapaksa also 
endeavored to win the population’s participation and support, deemed crucial in COIN 
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efforts. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces undertook a massive restructuring across the board 
that assisted them in covering multiple fronts along different axes successively and helped 
them adopt more innovative and flexible tactics.156 All these changes were made during 
the Rajapaksa government and facilitated the defeat of the LTTE militarily. 
c. Tamil Diaspora 
The outward migration of Sri Lankan Tamils started during the British occupation 
due to economic opportunities, especially for Tamils who knew how to speak English, who 
were hired predominately to work in the government of the Federated Malay States.157 But 
as the new government of Sri Lanka exhibited preferential treatment toward the Sinhalese, 
Tamils began migrating to the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States 
in 1956.158 More Tamil migrations followed as violence and conflict escalated. It was 
estimated that “one-third of the Sri Lankan Tamil community of 3 million lived outside Sri 
Lanka” in 2002.159  
3. Analysis of the Case  
This section analyzes the case of the Tamil diaspora using the political process and 
diamond models presented in the previous chapter. The political process model helps to 
determine how the Tamil diaspora formed and why it helped the LTTE in its struggle 
against the Sri Lankan government. The diamond model, on the other hand, aids in 
assessing the strategy of the two opposing forces to determine the efficiency and influence 
of the diaspora support. 
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a. The Tamil Diaspora’s Role Using the Political Process Model 
The ethnic persecution and conflict in Sri Lanka were the social changes that 
compelled Tamils to migrate. According to Christine Fair, those who left the country 
during these disruptive events were highly politicized.160 Once settled, as in the case of 
Western countries, they possessed political opportunities mostly absent in their home 
country, such as freedom of expression and anti-discrimination laws.161 These inspired the 
Tamil diaspora to engage in political activities, such as publishing, organizing, lobbying, 
and fundraising, all of which were impermissible for ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka.  
Living in democratic societies also offered them free and safe spaces to become 
involved in Sri Lanka’s armed struggle. It also helped them to establish organizations, 
networks, and fundraising activities to bolster the LTTE’s domestic and international 
operations. Some organizations, based in cyberspace, promoted transnational Tamil 
identity and revealed the deplorable conditions confronting Sri Lankan Tamils.162 
The common experience of the Tamil diaspora as victims and its aspiration for 
Tamil Eelam were reframed by the LTTE to develop linkages and sympathy. The LTTE 
asserted that its efforts were “the only way to achieve autonomy and security for the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora.”163 For these reasons, the Tamil diaspora established 
organizations that not only catered to growing Tamil refugee populations but also 
supported LTTE operations, including economic, political, military, and socio-cultural aid. 
The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora contributed $60 million annually, which funded 90 percent 
of the LTTE’s international military procurement as well as maintained offices and 
activities worldwide.164 The LTTE utilized diaspora organizations for propaganda and 
publicity to influence political and lobby groups in host governments to sympathize with 
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Tamil rights issues and criticize Sri Lankan government abuses.165 Financial contributions 
from the diaspora also helped the LTTE procure war materials needed to fight the Sri 
Lankan government. The Tamil diaspora communities continuously promoted Sri Lankan 
Tamil socio-cultural concerns to rekindle their shared political aspiration toward Tamil 
Eelam.166 According to Fair, these contributions further escalated the conflict in Sri 
Lanka.167 
b. Analyzing the Strategy Using McCormick’s Diamond Model 
This sub-section uses McCormick’s diamond model to examine the strategies of 
the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to determine the reasons behind the defeat of the 
once seemingly indestructible Tamil Tigers. Another focus of the analysis is to determine 
the relevance of the Tamil diaspora’s support of the LTTE. 
(1) Strategy 1: Gain Population Support 
Over the years of fighting and violence in Sri Lanka, the public developed war-
weariness, especially with rising casualties. The Rajapaksa government, before launching 
offensive operations against the LTTE in 2006, secured first the full support of the 
Sinhalese by presenting the notion of victory through propaganda. Population support was 
vital in conducting a war, especially when massive recruitment and mobilization were 
required. 
The LTTE, on the other hand, failed to seek the support of the remaining Tamil 
population in Sri Lanka. In desperation for recruits to augment their dwindling combatants, 
the LTTE implemented forced conscription and abducted minors, especially those 
orphaned in the 2004 tsunami catastrophe.168 The LTTE’s terror tactics and violent 
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activities alienated them from the population. And, according to Swamy, the insurgents’ 
actions were like the LTTE declaring war on the Tamil people.169  
(2) Strategy 2: Disrupt the Opponent’s Bid for Population Support 
In 2004, Vinayagamurthy Muralitharan, widely known as Karuna, the LTTE’s 
longest serving regional commander, broke away from the group “over long-simmering 
frustration with the movement’s inequitable treatment of Sri Lanka’s eastern Tamils.”170 
Karuna’s defection become a coup for the Sri Lankan government, which took the defector 
together with his loyal troops under its protection. The defector’s knowledge proved 
invaluable in defeating the LTTE. Moreover, Karuna’s surrender disrupted the LTTE’s 
influence in the east, greatly favoring Sri Lanka’s armed forces. The LTTE’s efforts in this 
strategy encouraged the sympathetic Tamil media not to report the group’s atrocities as a 
means of improving public perception. 
(3) Strategy 3: Direct Action against the Opponent 
When the Sri Lankan government went on offensive in 2006, they were totally 
prepared. The size of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces was increased to support the objective 
of clearing every territory of the LTTE. Military equipment essential for the strategy was 
procured. Command and coordination, including intelligence, were also improved. The 
restructuring, revitalization, and innovation of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces proved 
effective because, during the offensive operations, “the LTTE started losing one ship after 
another and suffered unprecedented battlefield reverses.”171 
The LTTE, on the other hand, failed to notice the development of the Sri Lankan 
Armed Forces, causing the degradation of its situational awareness.172 This intelligence 
failure proved detrimental for the LTTE as it led them to be overconfident. According to 
Perera, the LTTE adopted a strategy that “shifted to an open offensive posture using semi-
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conventional tactics, such as establishing camps and bases and holding defensive lines.”173 
Moreover, by engaging in a war of attrition, the LTTE’s declining combatants were no 
match for the Sri Lankan military. 
(4) Strategy 4: Disrupt the Opponent’s Link to International Actors 
The Sri Lankan government admitted its ineffectiveness in countering the LTTE 
transnational organization.174 The government’s predominant effort for this strategy was 
to keep India out of the war, as India’s state of Tamil Nadu had millions of Tamils, whose 
politicians were anti-Colombo and members of the coalition government.175 Colombo 
established “direct, high-level channels of communications” to regularly apprise New 
Delhi of their actions.176 
There is no evidence that the LTTE attempted to influence any international actors 
to withdraw support from the Sri Lankan government. However, during the offensive, some 
Western countries were unwilling to support Sri Lanka for humanitarian considerations.177 
(5) Strategy 5: Establish Link with International Actors 
The Rajapaksa government actively sought to establish ties with international 
actors to gain assistance in crushing the LTTE, and several countries that responded greatly 
contributed to the success of the Sri Lankan campaign. However, President Rajapaksa 
adopted a policy of disregarding and not compromising with any domestic or international 
pressure during the war.178 For him, capitulating to any external pressure would interrupt 
the operational tempo and provide breathing space for the LTTE. 
The LTTE lobbying efforts, according to Fair, “were extremely successful in 
cultivating states support for its movements in state capitals throughout the world during 
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1980s and 1990s. Up until about 2001.”179 Despite the LTTE’s global network of offices 
and cells across at least 40 countries, these foreign governments had minimal relations or 
leverage in Sri Lanka’s political and domestic affairs.180 Also, the enforcement of anti-
terrorism measures in the aftermath of 9/11 had a negative impact on the LTTE’s 
international relations activity for being labeled a foreign terrorist organization.181  
4. Conclusions 
The principal role of the Tamil diaspora in the LTTE’s strategy was foremost in 
providing financial resources, which allowed the LTTE to procure material and equipment, 
giving it an initial military advantage over the Sri Lankan government that lasted for more 
than 30 years. As Moorcraft has noted about the LTTE: “no other insurgency developed 
such extensive capabilities and over such a long period, relying largely on its own 
initiatives.”182 Aside from the financial assistance, the diaspora network also helped the 
LTTE establish international diplomacy and linkages with different countries and 
international organizations.  
Overreliance on the Tamil diaspora’s financial support led the LTTE to neglect the 
population, which had political and military implications for its strategy. Alienating itself 
from the remaining Tamil population constrained the LTTE to fight conventionally, instead 
of unconventionally. If the LTTE had access to the sanctuary and social support in Sri 
Lanka, it could have conducted alternative indirect defense strategies, which may have 
proved beneficial. As Arreguin-Toft notes, “When strong actors attack with a direct 
strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all things being equal, weak 
actors should win.”183 He further emphasizes that “in asymmetric conflicts, delay favors 
the weak.”184 
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The efficacy of the diaspora’s influence—economic, political, and military—
depends on the degree of linkages and leverage its host countries or sympathetic 
international actors have over the home country. Countries and international organizations 
sympathetic to the Tamil diaspora were not critical of the Sri Lankan military campaign 
against the LTTE. As Moorcraft emphasized, “The US, France and the UK could exert 
diplomatic pressure on Sri Lanka, but only India could directly affect the military 
campaign.”185 To be effective, diaspora support should be incorporated into the overall 
strategy. 
B. INDONESIAN ACEHNESE DIASPORA 
This section studies the role and influence of the Acehnese diaspora in the 
Indonesian conflict. The focus of the analysis is determining the value of the diaspora’s 
support to the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement, the main insurgent 
movement in Aceh, Indonesia. Part of the analysis determines how the diaspora helped in 
promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The case is organized into the following 
subsections: origin of the conflict, the players involved in the conflict, analysis of the case, 
and conclusion. 
1. Origin of the Conflict 
The historical context of the conflict emanated from the failure to meet the promise 
made by President Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, to bestow special status on 
Aceh for “its contribution to the struggle for Indonesian Independence.”186 The conflict 
was also linked to “Aceh’s reputation for its restive and Islamic militancy,” which declared 
the establishment of an Aceh Islamic State to protect Aceh’s regional and ethnic character 
from the government’s perceived partiality to the Indonesian Communist Party in 1953.187 
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Aceh in the 1960s through the early 1970s had no economic bearing in Indonesia, so it was 
left alone by the central government. But it all changed when liquid natural gas production 
started in the mid-1970s: “Aceh became a magnet for the greedy and the powerful, and 
therefore a site of economic and political contention.”188 Even Aceh was given a minor 
concession as “special region status”—the unrest still continued because the Acehnese 
perceived themselves as marginalized and not benefitting economically from the major 
development projects in Aceh.189 The mixture of these grievances and conditions led to 
the establishment of the Free Aceh Movement. 
2. The Players 
This sub-section discusses the actions and roles of different players to provide a 
clear understanding of how they contributed to the dynamics of the insurgency and COIN 
in the Indonesian conflict. The players include the insurgents, the government, and the 
Acehnese diaspora. 
a. Insurgents 
The GAM was established by Hasan di Tiro as the Aceh-Sumatra National 
Liberation Front in October 1976.190 The movement, according to Geoffrey Robinson, 
“demand [ed] for political and economic independence, with religious concerns mentioned 
only in passing.”191 The movement was composed initially of 70 well-educated men who 
were close associates of di Tiro.192 After its inception, the GAM was easily crushed by 
Indonesian COIN operations. By 1979, most of its leaders fled into exile, and its members 
either were imprisoned or went underground.193 From then on, Hasan di Tiro continued 
the Free Aceh Movement while in exile.  
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In 1989, the conflict renewed when hundreds of Libyan-trained GAM insurgents 
returned and consolidated in several areas in Aceh to train more guerillas.194 But, in 1991, 
the GAM was defeated once more by Indonesian armed forces; however, significant 
numbers of its members escaped to Malaysia where they found safe haven and support 
from the Aceh diaspora.195 GAM commanders established their operational command in 
Malaysia until 1998 and regularly traveled to Aceh to supervise the movement and keep it 
alive.196 After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the conflict was suspended because Indonesian 
forces withdrew and lifted military operations for a year.197 During pauses between battles, 
the GAM “recruited, trained, expanded and consolidated its position.”198 After series of 
hard bargaining, in February 2005, the GAM announced that it would set aside the goal for 
independence and accept the self-government solution for Aceh within the Indonesian 
state.199 In August that year, the Helenski Memorandum of Agreement was signed, ending 
the conflict in Aceh. 
b. Government 
During the authoritarian regime of President Suharto, the government implemented 
the “New Order,” a policy intended to improve the Indonesian economy, and one of its 
programs was to develop domestic oil production.200 However, the expected economic 
benefits from this policy did not reach Aceh due to corruption, favoritism, and the 
centralized economic decision-making of the government, which further reinforced 
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Acehnese feelings of marginalization and neglect.201 And when the GAM was organized, 
the Indonesian government and military responded by sending thousands of troops to hunt 
down the handful of insurgents to ensure stability in the area, particularly near oil 
production facilities.202 People in Aceh experienced “the hard edge of the regime” because 
Indonesian COIN was marked by terror and the forced mobilization of civilians.203 Such 
military and economic practices continued unabated even after the demise of the New 
Order in 1998. 
As the new government was being established, violent conflict continued in Aceh, 
and at the same time, negotiations with the GAM were held in 2000 to pacify the 
movement, but they failed.204 A peace initiative brokered by the Henri Dunant Center 
persuaded the government and the rebels to sign a peace agreement in 2002. After a short 
ceasefire, conflict resumed in 2003—until the GAM signed the Helenski Memorandum of 
Agreement with the Indonesian government. 
c. The Acehnese Diaspora 
Acehnese migrants, according to Antje Missbach, were already working and living 
in Malaysia before di Tiro established the GAM in 1976.205 The surge of Acehnese 
diaspora occurred in 1980s, in response to increasing violence and a lack of economic 
opportunities.206 Life as migrants and refugees was unpleasant, and their situation became 
harder when economic crisis struck Malaysia in 1997.207 With assistance from the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees, migrant Acehnese resettled in Western 
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countries.208 At the height of the conflict, there were 80,000 Acehnese living overseas, 
representing 2.5 percent of the 4.2 million Aceh population.209 
3. Analysis of the Case 
The case of the Acehnese diaspora is analyzed using the political process and 
diamond models. The political process model allows an understanding of how the 
Acehnese diaspora formed and why it supported the GAM against the Indonesian 
government. The diamond model, on the other hand, helps to assess the strategies of the 
two opposing forces and determine the efficiency and influence of the diaspora support. 
a. The Acehnese Diaspora’s Role Using the Political Process Model 
Conflicts and the absence of economic prospects compelled the Acehnese to leave 
Indonesia. Malaysia was the major gateway for exiles, migrants, and refugees due its 
proximity and existing Acehnese settlement.210 Political opportunities in Malaysia were 
minimal, usually in the form of political meetings held during religious gatherings and 
social occasions. In 1988, as the Acehnese community grew, the National Assembly, or 
the command center, was founded in Malaysia, tasked with organizing meetings among 
supporters, communicating with GAM leadership exiled in Sweden, raising funds, and 
organizing supplies from abroad.211 Di Tiro and other GAM leaders endeavored to build 
networks and offices in various countries while undertaking diplomatic and public relation 
activities without impediments from the Swedish state authority. The fall of Suharto in 
1998 and the Indonesian preoccupation in East Timor presented another political 
opportunity for the GAM to explore other strategies to advance Acehnese aspirations. 
In mobilizing resources, despite the constant threat of arrest, deportation, and 
maltreatment from the Malaysian authorities, Malaysia provided a safe haven from 
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Indonesian COIN operations and the freedom to pursue other political activities to meet, 
organize, and fundraise.212 The recruits trained in Libya were all recruited from the 
Acehnese diaspora in Malaysia. The students and activists abroad helped to expose the 
dismal conditions in Aceh “by organizing conferences, distributing information and 
establishing transnational networks,” all of which attracted the attention of international 
NGOs and civil societies.213 
For the Acehnese in exile, suffering still lingered even after leaving Aceh. Life in 
Malaysia was not easy, but those feelings established a sense of emotional connection and 
solidarity among themselves, about their perceived “community of suffering,” which 
helped to create the Acehnese diaspora.214 Antje Missbach reframes the diaspora’s 
grievances: “Facing massive collective pressure and deprivation, Acehnese in Malaysia 
reacted to depend [on] themselves, but they also directed their attentions to the other source 
of their collective hardship—the homeland conflict.”215 Western support was harnessed 
by framing grievances based on the “shared principles of democracy, human rights and an 
emphasis on a need to create political space in Aceh for a humanitarian assistance and civil 
society.”216 
Despite the fewer Acehnese compared with other diaspora around the world, they 
were more influential in homeland politics. The Acehnese diaspora, according to Missbach, 
“provided moral and ideological support rather than financial and material contribution,” 
which was “crucial to the progress of conflict in Aceh . . . [and] in finding peaceful 
resolution for the conflict.”217 
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b. Analyzing the Strategy 
Once again, this sub-section uses McCormick’s diamond model to examine the 
strategy of the Indonesian government and the GAM to assess the diaspora’s role behind 
the resolution of conflict in Aceh.  
(1) Strategy 1: Gain Population Support 
The Indonesian government in two instances pledged to grant special status and 
autonomy to Aceh to pacify and appease the Acehnese. Both instances were unsuccessful, 
partly due to the government’s insincerity and failure to deliver on the promises. The 
misunderstandings during negotiations and dialogues between the two parties affected the 
peace talks.  
The GAM had strong population support from the people of Aceh, who often 
looked up to GAM leadership and the Acehnese abroad as their “nursery of hope.”218 The 
Acehnese left in Indonesia expected their compatriots from abroad to seek aid in their 
favor.  
(2) Strategy 2: Disrupt the Opponent’s Bid for Population Support 
The state education system assisted the government of Indonesia in influencing 
Acehnese support and promoted the central government’s programs. The government’s 
efforts to use schools and mass media, according to GAM leadership, were destroying 
Acehnese “nationality, culture, polity and national consciousness.”219 
The abuses perpetrated by Indonesian COIN efforts facilitated an increase in GAM 
membership, whose motivation for joining was to seek revenge and justice. Other tactics 
to discredit the government included supplanting the local government structure by 
coercing and recruiting civil servants into the GAM-controlled administration. By 2001, 
the GAM had influenced or controlled 80 percent of Aceh villages.220  
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(3) Strategy 3: Direct Action against the Opponent 
As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian armed forces responded to the security threats 
with terror and violence by deploying overwhelming forces. They also compelled civilians 
to participate in COIN operations and be part of the military’s spy network. These methods 
only promoted a continued cycle of violence and sowed disorder in Aceh, which created 
resentment toward the government and sympathy for the insurgents. 
Even though the GAM was successively beaten in its attempts to wrest military 
control, it aimed to make it harder for the Indonesian government to control Aceh, bled the 
government financially, and kept the movement alive. GAM commanders subscribed to 
the guerilla warfare strategy of Mao Tse Tung. This was emphasized by a GAM fighter 
who said, “We don’t have to win the war, we only have to stop them from winning”—
expressing a classic case of protracted warfare.221 
(4) Strategy 4: Disrupt the Opponent’s Link to International Actors 
The Indonesian government’s effort for this strategy was preventing the GAM from 
getting international media mileage by enforcing restrictions on foreign media and NGO 
access. By blocking Aceh from the outside world, the GAM was denied the information 
and propaganda needed to further its cause in the international community.  
The GAM, on the other hand, forged closer interactions with human rights 
organizations, particularly friendly local and foreign NGOs. These organizations assisted 
the movement’s public relations strategy by providing awareness and validating the 
narratives of conflict, which garnered international sympathy and support. Other 
organizations in the Acehnese diaspora complemented the GAM’s activities, organizing 
groups that raised awareness regarding the conditions in Aceh, petitioning politicians in 
Washington, initiating press statements, and organizing rallies as well as international 
conferences. These efforts influenced international actors to pressure the Indonesian 
government for reform and change its military policy in Aceh. 
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(5) Strategy 5: Establish a Link with International Actors 
The government of Indonesia maintained its normal diplomatic relationship with 
other countries as conflict in Aceh developed. Its COIN operation was unimpeded from 
any external pressure despite the reported violence, except in 1998 when the International 
Monetary Fund imposed reforms toward democratization that affected the Indonesian 
policy in Aceh. 
The GAM’s leadership was promoting the strategy of internationalization, whereby 
it sought out the international community to communicate the movement’s domestic and 
international legitimacy and presented itself as the true representative of the Acehnese 
people.222 The strategy aimed to win the international community’s involvement, oblige it 
to take on the Acehnese cause, and condemn Indonesia’s policy in Aceh. The end state was 
to pressure Indonesian policy externally. 
4. Conclusions 
The Acehnese diaspora, although smaller in number than the Tamil diaspora, 
provided support for the Free Aceh Movement as well as moral, political, technical, 
financial, and military support.223 The Acehnese diaspora and the GAM leadership 
provided moral support because they were viewed in Aceh as a beacon of hope, who the 
people believed would rescue and liberate them from their economic and political 
sufferings. Through the strategy of internationalization, the diaspora harnessed the political 
support of international governments and NGOs, which helped them pressure the 
Indonesian government to loosen its policy in Aceh, thus strengthening the movement’s 
legitimacy both domestically and internationally. While in exile, GAM leadership was 
exposed to various ideas and developments, which it employed in the movement. One 
notable technological innovation the GAM proudly adopted was the use of SMS in leading 
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a war.224 The financial support coming from the Acehnese diaspora was one of the GAM’s 
key sources of funding, which helped it access arms networks and smuggle firearms 
directly into Aceh.225 This external support coming from the diaspora contributed to the 
GAM’s resiliency.  
The GAM’s safe haven in Malaysia constrained Indonesian COIN operations. 
David Galula in his “border doctrine” states that “the border areas are a permanent source 
of weakness for the counterinsurgent . . . usually exploited by the insurgents . . . often able 
to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”226 The border 
doctrine between nation-states further complicated the situation in Aceh. The Indonesian 
COIN was helpless against GAM fighters or diaspora members, who continued their 
political protests and activities from Malaysia.  
The GAM kept the war in Aceh going for more than two decades with the help of 
the diaspora. The apparent domestic conflict in Aceh had a feature of international identity 
with the participation of the Acehnese diaspora, which led to difficult, costly COIN 
operations on the part of the Indonesian government. GAM leadership, through diaspora 
support, helped establish networks and links that proved beneficial in pressuring Indonesia 
to pursue the peace process and elevating the GAM’s cause in the international community. 
This worldwide exposure led the GAM leadership to reframe its grievances and advocacies 
to be more acceptable in Western societies, attracting more supporters who condemned 
Indonesia’s Aceh policy. 
Even though the Acehnese diaspora helped prolong the conflict, it was also the 
main factor in pushing the GAM to a peace settlement. The case of the Aceh conflict shows 
that a diaspora can also be used to make peace. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS ON THE ROLES OF DIASPORA  
The two case studies illustrate that a diaspora can provide financial, moral, political, 
technical, or military support for an insurgent movement. Converting such external support 
into a strategy can transform an insurgent movement into a potent force. In both cases, 
insurgents supported by the diaspora made COIN operations difficult and costly, 
prolonging the conflict and, in some cases, making it more violent.  
Diaspora participation in the insurgency movement transforms the conflict from the 
domestic to the international level because a diaspora possesses a transnational identity. 
State power is limited to the territory it controls and rules, which imposes constraints on 
any COIN efforts; thus, its effectiveness is reduced when dealing with transnational actors 
who operate beyond the border. 
The diaspora’s support of an insurgency does not guarantee that an insurgency will 
succeed. The potential influence of a diaspora or its network depends on the strength of its 
ties to its host country or the international community. The home country’s vulnerability 
to a diaspora’s influence also depends on the degree of linkages—economic, social, or 
transnational, for example—a host country can leverage. To neutralize the effect of a 
diaspora’s support of the insurgency, a government strategy that attracts diaspora support 
while disrupting the insurgency from gaining diaspora backing must be implemented.  
The ideas developed on the roles of a diaspora provide a basis for analyzing the 
Filipino diaspora in the succeeding chapter. The focus of the analysis is on the supporting 
roles it provides to the communist movement and its influence in COIN. The next chapter 
evaluates the impact of the Filipino diaspora’s support on the insurgents’ strategy and 
investigates whether the government has a counter-strategy to mitigate its effect.  
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE PHILIPPINE DIASPORA IN 
INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY  
This chapter discusses the history and formation of the Filipino diaspora and 
International Solidarity Works. Then, it explains how the Filipino diaspora is used to 
pursue the Philippine communist strategy. Moreover, the diamond model helps to assess 
the Philippine government’s Executive Order 70—the “National Task Force to End Local 
Communist Armed Conflict”—and to draw conclusions.  
A. THE FORMATION OF THE FILIPINO DIASPORA 
Filipino migrations have spanned Philippine history, the sojourn beginning even 
before the founding of the republic in 1946. Robert Lawless describes Philippine migration 
in periods and waves: the prehistoric period, the Spanish period, the American period with 
four waves, and the global periods.227 At present, no actual documentation of Filipino 
migration during the prehistoric period exists, but it is highly probable that migration 
happened before Spain’s arrival. The existence of the Sultanate of Sulu, with its domain 
extending up to North Borneo, is a convincing reason for migration to nearby territories.  
During the Spanish colonial period, Filipinos were introduced to other civilizations, 
particularly those under Spanish rule. Accordingly, early Filipinos, mostly seaman from 
Spanish galleons, immigrated along Spain’s trading and exploration route, including Guam 
and Mexico.228 Filipinos coming from the elite class also migrated to Spain and other parts 
of Europe to pursue higher education.229 Since there was no orderly documentation of 
migration during the period, the possibility of migrating Filipino seafarers and students to 
Europe continued even after Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. 
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When the Philippines became an American colony in 1902, reliable documentation 
of Filipino migration started.230 The first wave of Filipino migration to the United States, 
mostly farm workers and students, occurred from 1908 to 1934.231 Since the Philippines 
possessed colonial status, these early migrants could freely enter and leave the United 
States but could not gain citizenship.232 The second wave of migration happened from 
1946 to 1965; they were the first migrants granted naturalized U.S. citizenship.233 The 
third wave occurred from 1966 to 1975 when Filipino immigrants, mostly professionals, 
brought their families along with them.234 Filipinos who migrated to the United States after 
the Immigration Act of 1990 constitute the fourth wave of migration.235  
The global period of Filipino migration commenced in 1974 when President 
Marcos enacted the Labor Export Policy under Presidential Degree 442.236 The program 
was initiated as a stopgap to address the economic crisis besetting the country. E. San Juan 
Jr. explains that the Philippines had been experiencing “severe deterioration in the lives of 
80% of Filipinos, rising unemployment and serious foreign debt problems,” which led the 
government to initiate the “warm body export.”237 Succeeding Philippine governments 
continued the program whereby, through the years, migrant remittances had become vital 
in keeping the country’s economic condition afloat. The significant contribution of Filipino 
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migrant workers to the economy earned praises from the Philippine government, which 
recognized them as modern-day heroes. 
With the continuous migration of Filipinos around the world, questions emerged: 
Could they be considered a diaspora? Was there a Filipino diaspora? The word diaspora 
had recently become a catchall term to describe an overseas migrant community, according 
to David Camroux.238 Camroux cited Michael Bruneau who rejects the notion of a Filipino 
diaspora and instead “prefers to categorize overseas Filipinos as a ‘transnational 
community,’ for these communities ‘do not possess the historic depth of diasporas’ and 
significantly, because they are ‘linked to a (sending) state which attempts to use its 
emigrants in order to become a transnational state.’”239 Filomeno Aguilar, on the other 
hand, insists on the presence of a diaspora and argues that “the global migration of Filipino 
labor is amenable to the construction of a diaspora” and further reframes them as “a labor 
diaspora.”240 Camroux concludes that Filipino communities abroad demonstrate the many 
attributes of a diaspora, although in “diffuse and diluted forms.”241 The existence of the 
Filipino diaspora was resolved when the authoritative Encyclopedia of Diasporas: 
Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World, published in 2005, included Filipino 
migrants on the list. This makes the Filipino diaspora, according to Aguilar, “the newest 
diasporic community in the whole world.”242  
The Philippine government has three categories for the more than 10 million 
Filipino migrants: permanent, temporary, and irregular.243 Permanent migrants are 
Filipinos who have taken the citizenship or naturalized in their host country.244 They 
constitute the 4.9 million Filipinos who settled primarily in the United States, Canada, 
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European countries (a small percentage), Australia, and New Zealand—64 percent of these 
are in the United States.245 Temporary migrants are those with fixed contract work who 
have no chance of gaining nationality in their host countries.246 These migrants include 
“land based and sea-based Filipino workers, intracompany transferees, students, trainees, 
entrepreneurs, businessmen, traders and others whose stay abroad is six month or 
more.”247 They total 4.2 million, mostly in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia 
accommodating one million OFWs.248 Irregular migrants are undocumented Filipinos or 
those without work permits or valid residence abroad.249 Based on one estimate, there are 
1.2 million illegal migrants, and 10 percent are either victims of illegal recruitment or 
human trafficking.250 
Improving one’s economic condition is the primary reason for Filipinos to migrate. 
As Aguilar underscores, “The major dispersals of population from the Philippines have 
been mainly of relatively low-wage labor. . . It is not abject poverty from which most labor 
migrants are fleeing: rather, their global movements are driven by desires for upward social 
mobility that are constrained by Philippine social structure.”251 The OFWs’ decision to 
work abroad is motivated by their aspiration to provide their families a brighter future, 
which also benefits the country from the remittances they send back. This aspiration for 
their families’ future tend to make the Filipino diaspora non-politicized, unlike other 
diasporas who have been forced to depart their country due to ethnic conflict or violence. 
The Filipino diaspora is different, according San Juan, because “Filipinos identification is 
not with a fully defined nation but with regions, localities and communities of languages 
and traditions.”252 Lawless also articulates this non-politicized status of OFWs, who are 
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called balikbayan when they return to the Philippines. He further explains by quoting 
Rafael, who points out that, “The term joins the Tagalog words balik (to return) and bayan 
(town, at least from the late nineteenth century on, or nation). As a balikbayan, one’s 
relationship to the Philippines is portrayed as a sentimental attachment to one’s hometown, 
extended family, and ethnic group rather than one’s loyalty to the nation-state.”253  
B. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WORKS  
As mentioned earlier, the economic crisis experienced by the Philippines was a 
disruptive event in the early 1970s, forcing the government to implement the Labor Export 
Policy. This policy provided opportunities not only for Filipinos who dreamed of greener 
pastures abroad but especially for those communist cadres trying to escape the 
government’s ongoing COIN campaign. In 1976, high-ranking members of the NDF, Luis 
Jalandoni and Consuelo Ledesma, became “the first Filipino political refugees in the 
Netherlands.”254  
Although there were very few Filipino migrants in the Netherlands, there was an 
existing organization known as the Philippine Group Netherlands (FGN), established in 
1975. The FGN was an informal group in which members discussed Philippine situations 
on a weekly basis and served as a platform to inform the Dutch public about their 
analysis.255 By joining the FGN, Jalandoni and Ledesma acquired a base of support and 
subsequently established the NDF’s international office in Utrecht. The office was co-
located with the FGN, which according to Sharon Quinsaat, “led to . . . blurring the lines 
between FGN as an international solidarity organization and NDF as national movement . 
. . Activists spun through revolving door between the solidarity and diaspora 
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movement.”256 The NDF international office also benefited politically from the Dutch 
government’s receptiveness to help the Philippines, being a predominantly Catholic 
country, on matters pertaining only to human rights, not armed struggle.257 
These political opportunities were further enhanced when the FGN helped the NDF 
mobilize resources. The FGN’s activities shifted to organizing infrastructure devoted to 
acquiring material and political support for the NDF, including publicizing propaganda to 
the government, media, and other social movements; organizing meetings among exiled 
national liberation movements; and fundraising for daily operations.258 FGN support to 
the NDF was invaluable. The FGN provided space for the NDF in the Netherlands to 
mobilize before the latter could seize political resources in the host society to engage in 
diaspora mobilization. Essentially, the FGN incubated the diaspora movements while the 
mobilizing structure was transplanted or replicated in host societies and while creating and 
anticipating favorable conditions for mobilization.259 
The weak communication ties between the Philippine government and the 
Netherlands at that time also freed the NDF from possible diplomatic protests from Manila. 
Instead of focusing on the idea of armed struggle and communist ideology to overthrow 
the Marcos regime, the NDF’s international office reframed grievances using popular 
policy discourse of the time, such as human rights and democracy. The combination of 
political opportunities, mobilization of resources, and the reframing of ideological ideas 
greatly benefitted the NDF. In a session on the Philippines of the “Permanent People’s 
Tribunal” held in 1980, the NDF was conferred “legal status in international society. They 
[were] empowered . . . to enforce the rights of their peoples, by armed struggle if 
                                                 
256 Quinsaat, 1022. 
257 Quinsaat, 1021. 
258 Quinsaat, 1022. 
259 Quinsaat, 1022. 
57 
necessary.”260 The declaration gave them some form of legal recognition in the 
international community and, at same time, a basis to conduct a people’s war in the 
Philippines. 
The NDF’s international office in the Netherlands, once established, began 
operations in 1980. The office serves as the NPA’s European operations. Its international 
activities are referred as Overseas Revolutionary Work (ORW) and can be classified as 
providing both direct and indirect support.261 Direct support supplies materials to the NDF, 
while indirect support involves activities that increase the NPA’s solidarity movement.262 
ORW was later recognized as the International Solidarity Works (ISW) and became the 
NDF’s network “in building international solidarity relations with parties, organizations, 
institutions and movements in so many countries” (see Figure 6).263  
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Figure 6. NDF Support Network Overseas264 
ISW has three specific lines of work: the broad solidarity movement (BSM), the 
overseas Filipino movement, and international diplomatic work.265 The activities are 
managed and organized by the NDF’s Council at the regional level and then coordinated 
with the country committees. BSM involves the activities that establish links with foreign 
governments, international NGOs and other organizations to gain political and material 
support.266 To handle such activities, a Philippine People’s Committee was set up to 
oversee BSM development and link it with other political or terrorist organizations.267 
The overseas Filipino movement involves the efforts intended to “arouse, organize, 
and mobilize Filipino compatriots abroad” by encouraging them to advocate for their rights 
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and support the revolutionary movement.268 The Commission of Filipino Migrant Workers 
was first established in 1979 and become operational in 1981 with various coordinating 
centers in Europe working closely with seamen and the Filipino community.269 Mass work 
is a different activity, designed to gain the support of Filipino migrants to assist the 
movement in attaining its objectives.  
International diplomatic work gains recognition for the communist movement by 
acquiring friends with influence in high places.270 Through the ISW, the NDF’s trade 
union organization, the Kilusang Mayo Uno, or the May One movement, gained 
international recognition from the European Union’s trade union organizations, which also 
provided it with indirect support.271 At present, most organizations affiliated with the NDF 
have established either international branches or partner organizations. Another major 
accomplishment of the ISW is the indirect support it receives from human rights groups 
such as Amnesty International and the International Commission on Jurists.272 Some of 
these international human rights organizations have been persistent vocal critics of the 
government’s COIN and anti-drug campaigns. Through diplomatic work, the NDF “has 
achieved a situation in which leading European governments all but turn a blind eye to the 
channeling of funds to the NPA.”273 
By taking advantage of the Labor Export Policy, the NDF’s international office 
enlisted NDF cadres in Manila to assist with expanding its European operations and 
organizing Filipino migrant workers.274 The injection of expert cadres enhanced the 
NDF’s European organization. According to Quinsaat, 
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These political entrepreneurs, who later received refugee status, were 
experienced activist from middle class upbringing possessing long history 
of organizing groups and communities. They brought with them knowledge 
and skills related to the repertoires of contention that were familiar and 
resonated with the Filipino population in the Netherlands.275 
The success of the NDF’s international office provides a blueprint for the establishment of 
similar organizations in countries hosting large concentrations of Filipino diaspora. As the 
primary international organization of the movement, it has a wide range of experience in 
terms of ideas, tactics, participants, and models of organization that can spill over to other 
organizations affiliated with the CPP or influence another social movement.276 
C. ROLES OF THE FILIPINO DIASPORA IN THE CPP STRATEGY 
The participation and mobilization of the Filipino diaspora during major political 
crises in the Philippines shows its potential game-changing influence on the government. 
The fall and departure of Marcos in the political scene in 1986 marked “the high point of 
political activism among Filipino diaspora” and showed “their potency as a force for 
political change when given channels for expression and unique circumstances.”277 The 
case of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipina domestic worker executed in Singapore in 1995, 
outraged and rallied Filipinos around the world, forcing the Philippine government to pass 
laws protecting OFWs. These events depicted the power of the Filipino diaspora; once 
politicized, it can be organized and marshalled for political and socio-cultural causes. The 
enactment of the Absentee Voting Act of 2003, which encouraged Filipinos overseas to 
vote, pulled the once non-politicized diaspora closer to Philippine political affairs. Such 
potential in the Filipino diaspora has not gone unnoticed in the Philippine communist 
movement.  
Relying on experiences in establishing an international office in the Netherlands, 
the NDF has conducted ISW activities in countries with large populations of Filipino 
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diaspora. Using diaspora support and connections, ISW activities aim to exploit the 
linkages between the Philippines and the diaspora’s host countries to gain leverage for the 
insurgency. Five possible ISW linkages can be exploited: economic (foreign direct 
investments, credit, trade agreements, and foreign assistance like USAID and IMF); 
geopolitical (includes bilateral or multilateral agreements, regional organizations, and 
military ties); social (degree of people’s movement and association across borders like 
tourism and migration); communication (denseness and flow of information exchanged 
between countries, such as through the internet and mass media communication); and 
transnational civil society (networks or ties with international party organizations and 
NGOs).278  
The above linkages correlate with the government’s fifth strategy according to the 
diamond model: establish links with international actors. A state’s level of connection with 
other states also defines the degree of leverages it holds or vice versa. If a state is dependent 
on another state’s economy, the other state has economic leverage or power in terms of 
economy over the dependent state. By understanding these linkages, an insurgency can 
devise actions that undermine the home country’s relationship by either directly disrupting 
it or influencing the host country’s policy. These actions are the insurgent’s fourth strategy: 
to disrupt an opponent’s link to international actors to ensure dominance in the external 
environment. An insurgency that explores and influences its diaspora’s ties with host 
governments, civil society, and international organizations can use the link as leverage to 
“create external pressure on homeland government.”279 As ISW efforts undermine the 
strong linkages of the Philippines with other countries, particularly the United States, it 
makes COIN difficult and costly for the Philippine government by highlighting 
government abuses, increasing the likelihood of international actor assistance, 
domesticating ideas, and reshaping the balance of power.280  
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The strong communication linkages ensure the insurgents’ propaganda efforts 
against the Philippine government are publicized internationally through Filipino migrant 
media networks, even when there is insufficient evidence. Propaganda can influence social 
movements among the Filipino diaspora, which later might conduct mass demonstrations 
or lobby its host country for withdrawal of military support and aid to the Philippines. One 
notable example was the alleged abuses committed by the Philippine military against 
indigenous peoples, which were used by BAYAN activists in San Francisco, California, as 
an issue to urge the U.S. government to stop providing military assistance to the 
Philippines.281 ISW’s connection and network with international lobbying groups or civil 
society mean a likely response as part of the solidarity against the noted violations in the 
Philippines. This is similar to the “boomerang effect,” whereby a non-state actor 
experiencing repression in one’s home country seeks the help of international allies to 
intervene or pressure the government to make necessary changes.282 As in the War on 
Drugs campaign in the Philippines, NDF-affiliated groups called for an international 
investigation due to alleged massive human rights violations; the International Criminal 
Court immediately acted without even consulting concerned government institutions.283 
Also, a member of the Filipino diaspora has worked with BAYAN, a leftist organization 
in the Philippines, as a healthcare activist; the Filipino–American direct participation could 
spark diplomatic tensions if something happened while aiding the insurgents.284 The term 
domestication means the adoption of international contention and ideas at the national 
level, or “transforming international norms into domestic demand.”285 Similarly, the 
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freedom of expression and individual human rights adopted in the West are frequently 
espoused by leftist organizations in the Philippines as a means of guaranteeing themselves 
protection from government persecution. Reshaping the balance of power occurs when 
linkages provide protection or prestige to an organization. Even with the declaration of the 
CPP-NPA as a “foreign terrorist organization” by the U.S. government in 2002, Jose Maria 
Sison, the CPP-NPA-NDF leader exiled in the Netherlands, has not been arrested or 
deported back to the Philippines.286 This is due to the effort of the GUE/NGL from the 
European Parliament, which actively campaigned for the CPP and Sison “not to be put on 
the terrorist list of the European Union.”287 
D. EXECUTIVE ORDER 70, THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S 
COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY 
On December 4, 2018, President Duterte signed Executive Order 70 (EO 70), 
entitled “Institutionalizing the Whole-of-Nation Approach in Attaining Inclusive and 
Sustainable Peace, Creating a National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed 
Conflict, and Directing the Adoption of a National Peace Framework.”288 EO 70 lays out 
the government’s strategy to end the communist insurgency. Again, McCormick’s 
diamond model helps to assess the current strategy of the Philippine government. 
EO 70 underscores the institutionalization of the whole-of-nation approach, 
whereby the government seeks to involve all sectors in the pursuit of lasting peace in the 
country. It directs all departments, bureaus, offices, and agencies of the government to 
provide the necessary support for the task force. It also encourages the private sector, non-
government organizations, and other stakeholders to participate in all peace-building 
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programs, plans, and activities from the regional down to the barangay level.289 The task 
force is headed by the president and comprises different department secretaries as 
members. By involving everyone in the activity, with the president as head of the task 
force, EO 70 aims to elicit the population’s participation. This is similar to the objective of 
the diamond model’s first strategy: gain population support. 
The National Peace Framework includes principles, policies, plans, and programs 
that prioritize and synchronize the delivery of basic services and social development 
packages in conflict-affected and vulnerable areas to address the root causes of 
insurgency.290 It has been envisioned to respond to local needs; as such, mechanisms for 
localized peace engagement can be implemented while being supervised and orchestrated 
at the national level.291 In the diamond model, alleviating the sources of popular unrest 
through the broad-based policy of social and political reform involves the activities in 
Strategy 2—disrupting the opponent’s bid for population support—which aligns with the 
programs of the National Peace Framework. 
To support EO 70, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) formulated the AFP 
Development and Support Plan, “Kapayapaan,” with the mission to “conduct development 
support operations to sustain the peace, ensure security and help maintain public order to 
foster the foundation for inclusive economic and human development of the Filipino 
People.”292 This objective mandated that the AFP conduct sustained operations against 
terrorist organization and peace spoilers in the country, contribute to the promotion of 
peace, actively support law enforcement, and participate in nation building.293 All these 
activities contribute to the intent of EO 70, which also corresponds with the diamond 
model’s third strategy: direct action against the opponent. 
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Employing McCormick’s diamond model to assess EO 70 reveals that Philippine 
COIN employs the first three strategies of the model, suggesting the priority of effort is 
more the internal than external environment. A notable indicator of this is the exclusion of 
the secretary of foreign affairs and secretary of labor and employment in the membership 
of the Task Force, whose department’s policies can influence millions of migrant Filipinos. 
This oversight, which set aside the direct involvement of these two government agencies 
in the campaign, indicates the planners’ lack of appreciation or understanding of the 
external dimension of the Philippine communist insurgency. Another reason could be the 
absence of a viable strategy to disrupt the insurgents’ international link. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The Philippine diaspora has been recently recognized as the newest diasporic 
community in the world. It constitutes 10 million migrant Filipinos worldwide, who 
courageously seek opportunities abroad, hoping to give their families a better future. Since 
their main reason to migrate is to improve their social mobility, they are categorized as a 
labor diaspora. Unlike other diasporas, it is not dispersed because of ethnic violence or 
conflict; hence, it is not politicized. 
The Philippine government publicly recognizes Filipino migrants as modern-day 
heroes. The country’s economy greatly benefits from the remittances they send back to 
their families. Aside from the recognition, the government has enacted policies and 
programs giving them some legal protections and assistance. But some policies, such as 
the Dual Citizenship Act and Absentee Voting Act, encourage Filipino migrants to be 
involved in Philippine politics, leading them to become more politicized and potentially 
vulnerable to political entrepreneurs.  
The National Democratic Front’s ISW considers Filipino diaspora to be an integral 
part of the Philippine revolution. The ISW is the initial contact for NDF cadres while setting 
up or establishing a partnership with an organization abroad. The social capital it has 
fostered through various contacts, networks, and associations is important for mobilizing 
resources to exploit potential political opportunities in the host country that supports the 
NDF’s agenda and the formation of a social movement. Once an organization is formed, it 
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is mobilized to disrupt the linkages between the host country and the Philippines with the 
objective of diminishing Manila’s international legitimacy. ISW efforts often influence the 
Filipino diaspora to provide political and moral support to the movement.  
Interestingly, NDF efforts to mobilize Filipino migrants could be attributed to the 
minimal effort by the Philippine government to counter it. Executive Order 70, the 
government’s current strategy, seeks to counter the ISW efforts through international 
engagements. However, planners may have considered ISW a part of the security issues. 
Hence, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have been 
given the lead role in this program. But any NDF organization, whether in the Philippines 
or abroad, supported by a diaspora or international organization, is already transforming 
into a transnational organization. This means there could be a dedicated department set up 
to spearhead counter-ISW operations in the international environment. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the Department of Labor and Employment in tandem could be 
considered for these tasks as both agencies’ policies and programs could influence and 
affect the millions of migrant Filipinos. And doing so aligns with the functions and essence 
of both departments to reach out to all Filipinos abroad. 
ISW efforts are two-pronged. They seek to subvert Philippine ties with different 
external actors by delegitimizing the government and, at the same time, connecting and 
promote the NDF in the international community. These efforts help improve the NDF’s 
status abroad and provide leverage to undermine counterinsurgency activities by means of 
propaganda and misinformation. NDF propaganda often portrays the Philippine 
government as human rights violators, hoping that the international community will 
condemn it and, at the same time, force the U.S. government to stop providing military aid 
to the Philippines. This action aims to bolster the NDF’s images as a human rights advocate 
and true champion of the Filipino people. ISW activities provide the NDF’s structures 
abroad, which ensure continuous political protest as either separate from or complementary 
to the armed campaign in the Philippines. It aims to influence other countries to support 
the movement and intervene on its behalf.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The thesis underscores the significance of external support to an insurgency: it 
prolongs the conflict, incurs more casualties, and creates difficulty for negotiated 
resolution. After the Cold War, aside from the traditional state-sponsored assistance, 
various non-state actors emerged to become sources of outside support to insurgencies. 
Prominent among these non-state actors were diasporas, immigrant communities settled in 
other countries.294 The existence of the Filipino diaspora provides an opportunity to 
examine the diaspora’s role in the ongoing insurgency situation in the Philippines. This 
chapter answers the three research questions presented in Chapter I. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
First, the role of the Filipino diaspora in the ongoing insurgency is to provide a 
wide range of support to the armed struggle waged by the Communist Party of the 
Philippines, which includes moral, political, technical, financial, and military support. The 
Filipino diaspora could provide moral support by participating in activities, such as 
demonstrations and cultural meetings, designed to create public awareness for both host 
and home countries by endorsing the movement while discrediting the Philippine 
government. Through diaspora networks, it could assist political entrepreneurs allied with 
the communist movement, such as BAYAN, the prominent leftist organization in the 
Philippines, to establish connections with civil society and political entities critical of the 
Philippine government. These associations might help provide political assistance through 
exerting diplomatic and political pressure to the COIN forces. Technical support can be in 
the form of ideas and technical innovations that improve the communist movement’s 
operations. These innovations may include the use of mass media as well as social and 
communication networks, which broadcast the movement’s propaganda. Financial support 
includes the funds that sponsor the NDF’s international office and its allied organizations’ 
activities abroad, mostly sourced from international non-government organizations. The 
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Filipino diaspora’s military support is limited to sending funds for the procurement of 
weapons; however, some have participated directly in the armed struggle in the Philippines. 
The participation and support of the Filipino diaspora are altering the security 
environment because the diaspora possesses a transnational personage; it is transforming 
the conflict from the domestic to the international level. Transnational organizations and 
actors can have relatively safe spaces while carrying out insurgent activities abroad, such 
as mass action and resource mobilization. State power is limited to the territory it controls 
and rules, which imposes constraints on any COIN efforts; thus, its effectiveness is reduced 
when dealing with transnational actors that operate beyond the border. Due to information 
asymmetry and the international dimension of insurgency, government forces, for the most 
part, are unable to counter the insurgents’ international propaganda and maneuvering. 
Diaspora support of the insurgency makes COIN difficult and costly. 
Second, as J. Bowyer Bell points out, “revolutionary movements are usually 
transnational by necessity, not by design.”295 The Philippine communist movement 
recently realized the importance of the Filipino diaspora as an integral part of the 
revolutionary movement. The Filipino diaspora’s participation and mobilization during 
major political crises in the Philippines confirmed its game-changing potential in affecting 
political change, something that did not go unnoticed by the NDF. The NDF believes the 
diaspora’s networks and ties can be manipulated to subvert and disrupt the Philippine 
connections with international actors. 
It was ten years after the establishment of the CPP that the NDF international office 
in Utrecht started organizing Filipino migrant communities in Europe. Due to the low 
numbers of Filipino migrant communities and weak diplomatic ties between the 
Philippines and countries in Europe, particularly the Netherlands, ISW activities in the 
early 1980s made little impact on the Philippine government. This initial experience led to 
the shift of ISW efforts to countries hosting large populations of Filipinos and where the 
Philippine government had established strong connections, such as the United States of 
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America. The move ensures that international endeavors will minimize Manila’s influence 
in the external environment. 
Finally, McCormick’s diamond model highlights how leveraging the ISW is the 
CPP-NPA-NDF’s strategy to gain legitimacy in the international environment. Efforts 
include disrupting the Philippine government’s link with external actors while promoting 
itself in the international community through broad alliances and ties with international 
organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Commission on Jurists. 
By operating in a liberal democratic country, such as the United States, NDF cadres can 
freely conduct ISW activities within the limits of the law. Rhetoric about the armed struggle 
and communist ideology is reframed into the ideals embraced by Western countries, such 
as human rights and democratization. Such actions camouflage and assist the NDF in 
engaging people with similar concerns and luring them unwittingly to support the 
movement. This is consistent with ISW’s goal to dominate the external environment in 
favor of the insurgency while reducing the government’s international support. A recent 
comment from a U.S. senator about human rights abuses in the Philippines provides an 
example of a foreign lawmaker being deceived to believe the “false narratives spread by 
those who want to bring the [Philippine] government down.”296 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The impact of the Filipino diaspora’s support to the Philippine insurgency 
movement does not guarantee that the CPP-NPA-NDF will succeed. The reason the 
diaspora migrated for economic reasons, so unlike other diasporas, historically it is not 
been politicized. But with ISW’s agitation and propaganda efforts, members of the diaspora 
have been aroused, organized, and mobilized to help the Philippine insurgency movement. 
The desire of Filipino migrants to return home could be an opportunity for the government 
to engage and persuade them to participate in the conduct of peacemaking activities.  
                                                 
296 “Palace Slams ‘Grandstanding’ U.S. Senator Sanders for Comments on Human Rights Abuses in 




If the goal is to neutralize the diaspora’s support of the insurgency, then a 
government strategy that attracts diaspora support and, at the same time, disrupts the 
insurgency from attracting diaspora could be implemented. One recommendation is to 
conduct strategic communications to improve EO 70.297 EO 70’s whole-of-nation 
approach provides mechanisms that integrate the different forms of strategic 
communications. With the task force organization set up from the local to national level, 
along with some international components, messages could be synchronized for specific 
target audiences. Public affairs, psychological operations, and public diplomacy could 
assist EO 70 in credibly articulating policies and programs that can persuade target 
audiences, especially the Filipino diaspora, to support the objectives of ending the 
communist armed conflict. 
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